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The rapid progress of deep neural network architectures is allowing both to automate 
the production of artworks and to extend the domain of creative expression. As such, it 
is opening new ground for professional and amateur artists alike. A major asset of these 
new computer processes is their capacity to derive, from a training phase, a generative 
model from which new artifacts can be produced. This attribute allows for a wide range of 
novel applications. New music or paintings in the style of famous artists can be produced 
at the click of a button, or combined to form new artworks. New graphical compositions 
can be “hallucinated” by the deep algorithmic models to produce striking, unexpected, 
visual forms. By the same token, the dependence on preexisting, protected, artworks 
lays the ground for potential zones of friction with the rights holders of the source data 
that helped shape the generative model. This articulation, between the popular creative 
movement initiated by the deep neural architectures and the preexisting rights of the 
authors, leads to a confrontation between the present legal framework for the protection 
of artistic creations and the new modalities offered by these new technological objects. 
The present work will address the conditions of protection of creations generated by 
deep neural networks under the main copyright regimes.
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inTrODUcTiOn
Algorithmic productions have been part of the artistic landscape for more than half a century: 
from avant-garde procedural musical creations to new forms of computer graphics languages, they 
have opened innovative arenas for artistic expression and often served as exploration grounds for 
introducing and testing new computational tools that have become mainstream. Yet, the recent 
newfound generative capacity of deep-learning processes, catalyzed by the increase in computational 
power and the access to a wealth of training data, has boosted the expressive capacity of automated 
creations to unprecedented—and unforeseen—levels. Within the newfound field of “constructive 
machine-learning,” multidisciplinary efforts are now being deployed to explore and formalize the 
creative potential of these latest generations of algorithms, both extending and specializing the ongo-
ing debate addressing the broader field devoted to exploring the notion of computational creativity.1
1 “Neural Information Processing Systems” (NIPS), one of the major machine learning conferences, has hosted in 2013, 2015, 
and 2016 a workshop on the very subject of “Constructive Machine Learning” (http://www.cs.nott.ac.uk/~psztg/cml/). For a 
general discussion on the field of computational creativity, the reader is referred to the foundational work of Boden (1999, 2010) 
as well as the more recent studies by Colton and Wiggins (2012) and Jordanous (2012).
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This drastic change prefigures nothing less than a revolution 
in the modalities of personal expression as deep-learning frame-
works permeate the creative toolkit available to professionals 
and amateurs alike. Examples of algorithmic creations based on 
deep neural architectures are indeed now spreading beyond the 
confines of artistic and academic experiments to reach larger 
audiences. Deep convolutional networks, such as DeepDream, 
now “hallucinate” new forms of automated graphical creations, 
both expressionist textures and surreal collages, that are striking 
in their eccentric yet whimsical character (Berov and Kuhnberger, 
2016). Other deep neural architectures based on autoregressive 
generative models, such as WaveNet (Oord et  al., 2016), break 
new ground in sound and music production. From images to 
music, with forays into the realm of literature—narrative or 
poetry—and even in the more distant theater of choreography, 
most artistic fields are now infused by the prowess and potential 
of deep neural creations.
Yet, new, radical, and artistic endeavors are often associated 
with societal frictions [in particular when involving technical 
mediation: see O’Hear (1995)]. Here, the rise and populariza-
tion of novel creative artifacts are bound to raise questions about 
their legal protection and of their ownership as defined by copy-
right laws.2 Several of these issues have already been the subject 
of—mostly doctrinal—debates, at the intersection between the 
fields of computational creativity and intellectual property law 
(see, e.g., Bridy, 2012; Buccafusco et  al., 2014, and references 
therein). However, the hybrid nature of these new constructions 
(hybrid in the sense that they are rooted in human data but 
grow and evolve automatically through the interpretative filter 
of a learnt algorithmic model) highlights specific questions 
that require a detailed analysis of the modalities involved in 
the underlying generative processes. The opacity of the causal 
chain leading from the training data to the final product, the 
lack of interpretability of the model by which the object is cre-
ated is a first hurdle that prevents an immediate resolution of 
copyrightability and ownership. A second is the multiplicity 
of interactions between the automata and the various actors 
involved: from the gathering and selection of training sets, to 
the choice of architecture and training methodology, from the 
setting of parameters, to the definition of a stopping criterion. 
A third stumbling block is the emergence of new forms of inter-
actions between a deep model and an artist’s input: the artist 
as curator, the stylistic transfer between multiple sources, the 
possibility to orient, retrain and guide the deep models toward 
the production of artistic objects, are but a few of the new roles 
that an artist can now take on.
Who is the author when the machine creates? What are the 
rules to delineate the perimeter of ownership in deep-generative 
art? Piercing through the complexity of the model and disen-
tangling the multiple contributions at play in the generation 
of such a creation will be required not only to characterize a 
2 Other novel technical tools—such as blockchain (see, e.g., Zeilinger, 2016)—are 
bound to impact the intellectual property landscape, in particular in terms of the 
traceability of creative objects. The scope of the present study will be, however, 
limited to the subset of technical intermediaries susceptible to participate in (or 
substantially influence) the creative generation of artistic artifacts.
protectable object but also to identify the putative creators and 
assign an ownership to said object. After reviewing the current 
status of “deep creations” in the domain of artistic productions 
(see The Rise of Deep Creations), guidelines for the qualification 
of the artistic objects derived from these neural architectures in 
the context of copyright law will be provided (see The Protection 
of Deep Creations). Doing so will depend upon, firstly, the defini-
tion of modalities of identification, within the creative artifact 
of a trace, a tangible imprint, of the creators’ intent and of his/
her personality and, secondly, the determination of the presumed 
contributors to the creation. This analysis will be complemented 
by a discussion of two forms of deep creations: style transfer and 
training data selection.
The rise OF DeeP creaTiOns
The development of computer-generated arts follows closely the 
technological evolution of both the hardware platforms and the 
algorithmic processes from which they emerge. Deep neural 
networks are one of the latest trends in more than half a century 
of digital artistic experimentations marked by an ever increasing 
automation of the creative process. In this movement of transfer, 
from human prerogatives to machine-based attributes, it is easy, if 
not tempting, to mythify the creative contribution of the automata. 
As an antidote to this tendency, a basic understanding of the inner 
workings of the algorithmic intermediaries is required to sepa-
rate what is due to human action from what relies on machine 
automation. Before investigating the possibility of a protection 
of artistic creations generated through deep architectures, a foray 
into the genealogy of algorithmic art seems therefore appropriate, 
if only to better measure their technical characteristics and assess 
the novelty of their contribution.
From rule-Based systems to neural 
networks
A constant source of experimentation and stimulation, technical 
innovation offers an ever new vehicle for artists to explore the 
reaches of creative expression. As such, cutting-edge technolo-
gies are often rapidly integrated in the constantly growing toolset 
of the artistic community. Computer-based applications have 
participated in this process as early as the late 50s, delving into 
the random generation of shapes, with Desmond Paul Henry’s 
drawing machine (O’Hanrahan, 2016), or attempting to channel 
the production of procedural patterns as demonstrated by the 
works displayed at the first exhibitions of “Computergraphik” 
in February 1965, in Stuttgart, Germany (Klütsch, 2007). Not 
limited to graphic arts, the expressive capacity of computer 
programs, anticipated, a century earlier by Ada Lovelace,3 was 
immediately applied to music too, where the mathematical 
foundation of musical systems established since Pythagoras 
3 “Supposing, for instance, that the fundamental relations of pitched sound in the 
signs of harmony and of musical composition were susceptible of such expression and 
adaptations, the engine might compose elaborate and scientific pieces of music of any 
degree of complexity or extent” (Bowles, 1970, p. 4). Lady Lovelace was not of the 
opinion, though, that machines could ever be considered “creative” on the ground 
that “they could not originate anything” (Dartnall, 1994, p. 33).
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and expanded with the canon compositions of the fifteenth 
century, offered a fertile ground for computer-based automa-
tion (Grout and Palisca, 1996). Using new compositional rules, 
easily transferrable into an algorithmic language, new artworks 
emerged, such as the Illiac suite, composed in 1957, that unveiled 
as yet unexplored musical territories (Hiller and Isaacson, 1959). 
These first procedural approaches were soon improved upon 
and expanded with approaches to incorporate a probabilistic 
framework, such as in Iannis Xenakis’ “Morsima-Amorsima” 
(1962).4 More than simple tools, operating to transfer the artist’s 
fully fledged intentions on a material substrate, the potential of 
computers to open and catalyze new forms of creations was thus 
quickly recognized. As A. Michael Noll, one of the early com-
puter artists, noted in 1967, “[i]n the computer, man has created 
not just an inanimate tool but an intellectual and active creative 
partner that, when fully exploited, could be used to produce wholly 
new art forms and possibly new aesthetic experiences” (Noll, 1967, 
pp. 89–95). Yet, the precursors of computer-based automation 
were forced to concede that “the process of constructing each new 
system was tedious because each was custom-crafted. The major 
difficulty was acquiring the requisite knowledge from experts and 
reworking it in a form fit for machine consumption,” a process 
of “knowledge engineering” that did not easily translate to the 
artistic landscape (Buchanan and Duda, 1983, p. 167). Reliant 
on a combination of stochastic variations and preprogramed 
formulaic definitions of artistic expression, these pioneering 
approaches were indeed essentially limited in their generative 
capacity by the possibility to comprehend and express in a set 
of rules the structural complexity of an artistic framework, be it 
traditional or avant-garde.
It is only with the advent of machine-learning techniques that 
it became possible to circumvent the explicit, laborious enuncia-
tion of rules associated with a creative intent or an artistic style. 
Armed with sufficient training data, these systems were indeed 
able to identify and capture automatically some of the stylistic 
features common to the examples they were provided with during 
a training phase. Using these extracted esthetic characteristics 
as an expressive palette opened new creative avenues, allowing 
the production of artistic works resembling existing ones or 
mixing a variety of styles, without requiring the creative process 
underlying these works to be deciphered and encoded. As one of 
the most promising early machine-learning techniques, neural 
network architectures were, thus, soon assimilated by computer 
artists. Using data to learn musical structure, neural networks 
were first used as a mechanism to elaborate a composition by 
learning note-to-note transitions (Todd, 1989; Mozer, 1994). 
Other attempts learned to improvise beats and melodies as part of 
a jazz band (Nishijima and Watanabe, 1993), or to select synthetic 
images based on an evaluation of their esthetic value (Machado 
and Cardoso, 1997), allowing the learning set as much as the 
neural network training protocols became constitutive elements 
of the artistic product. However, in spite of a promising debut, 
4 See Xenakis and Kanach (1992) and other productions of the “Equipe de 
Mathématique et Automatique Musicales” his computer-assisted composition 
laboratory EMAMu, founded by Xenakis in 1966.
and much associated hype, the practical difficulties in training 
the large multilayered neural networks required to express rich 
features, coupled with the limitations of the available computing 
power, hindered their widespread application.5
From shallow to Deep neural networks
For a while, neural networks seemed confined to selected applica-
tions, where specialized architectures and optimization method-
ologies had proved effective [such as digit recognition based on 
convolutional networks and back-propagation, as designed by 
LeCun et al. (1995)]. They were otherwise superseded by alterna-
tive, seemingly more principled, machine-learning frameworks, 
amenable to cope with a range of large-scale problems and less 
prone to overfitting (Scholkopf and Smola, 2001). This status 
quo, however, changed drastically in 2006 when an algorithmic 
breakthrough allowed the training of very large multilayered, 
densely connected, and neural network architectures (Hinton 
et al., 2006; Bengio et al., 2007). The realization that greedy unsu-
pervised training could be relied on as a means of initializing 
the network weights and to bootstrap a subsequent supervised 
fine-tuning back-propagation phase, together with fast-paced 
technological progress in terms of computational capacity, as 
well as the access to vast resources of training data, all combined 
in creating a new platform where neural networks could, once 
again, thrive. Since then, these architectures have met with 
unprecedented success, solving complex problems in a vast 
array of applications, from image analysis, speech recognition, 
and natural language processing to automatic robotic control 
(LeCun et al., 2015). As a matter of fact, these so-called “deep 
neural networks” are now becoming the de facto one-stop-shop 
of machine-learning solutions.
Why such a landslide? Theoretical results suggest that deep 
architectures are needed in order to learn complex representa-
tions that capture high-level abstractions [see Bengio (2009) for 
a review]. However, generating such representations proved dif-
ficult before the training protocols introduced by Geoff Hinton 
and collaborators. While early days rule-based approaches were 
ineffective at scaling to new complex problems, so was the labor-
intensive “feature engineering” required to translate raw data 
(e.g., images, speech, and language) into a set of meaningfully 
formatted inputs susceptible to comprehension by the previous 
generations of “shallow” machine-learning architectures: a 
costly process that required a significant investment by highly 
specialized experts. Deep neural networks, conversely, have 
been demonstrated to be not only capable of discovering the 
building blocks that compose the data on which they are trained 
but can also do so at different levels of abstraction, across mul-
tiple layers. Rich features describing the raw inputs are thereby 
automatically learnt by the network, in a hierarchical fashion, 
through a layer-wise generative process. Distributed represen-
tations emerge as training progresses, each layer representing 
5 Michael Mozer recognized that his early recurrent neural network compositions 
“were not musically coherent, lacking thematic structure and having minimal phrase 
structure and rhythmic organization” (Mozer, 1994, p. 280), highlighting thereby 
the difficulty of basic neural network architectures to memorize and learn longer 
musical phrases.
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more abstract concepts formed by the composition of features 
captured at the lower levels of the architecture (Zeiler and 
Fergus, 2014). For example, in the case of images, each unit 
in a given layer can be interpreted as a filter that responds to 
particular features in an input image: simple ones, such as edges, 
in the first layers, and more complex aggregates, higher in the 
network hierarchy. The top layers of the network end up—if suf-
ficiently deep—capturing the content of the image, i.e., forming 
archetypal representations of the objects on which they have 
been trained: faces, animals, buildings, etc. (Mahendran and 
Vedaldi, 2014). In a symmetric movement, the potential of 
deep architectures to encode complex structures such as images 
or sound can also be used to produce new expressions of these 
objects: a property that has initiated a new wave of creative 
applications in the fine arts.
Deep creations in the Field
Graphic Art
Among the most advertised of these recent productions, the 
striking visual creations of DeepDream have participated in a 
public recognition of the “hallucinating” power of deep neural 
networks (Berov and Kuhnberger, 2016). Originally developed 
in 2014 as part of the ImageNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition 
Challenge, based on a convolutional neural network architec-
ture, the DeepDream image generation engine relies on an 
iterative process of modification of an input image so that the 
response of specific neurons, characteristic of certain features 
(e.g., faces or animals), is maximized. Patterns already present 
in the original image are thus progressively enhanced to let 
those selected features emerge in the regions of the image 
where they fit best, giving birth to chimeric constructions in 
a manner akin to the pareidolia phenomenon that finds us 
seeing familiar shapes while cloud-watching. Processed by the 
neural network, psychedelic forms and figures combine with 
the original image to create a landscape evocative of an acid 
mix between Hieronymus Bosch’s fantastic imagery, Giuseppe 
Arcimboldo’s portraits, and the slightly oppressive and colorful 
patchwork paintings of Hervé Di Rosa. Works produced with 
the DeepDream architecture have already been exhibited and 
auctioned in February 2016 at Gray Area, the San Francisco gal-
lery, and arts foundation,6 and the code has been released under 
a Creative Commons license. A public web interface is available 
at http://DeepDream.com for users to upload and process their 
own images.
Other attempts at integrating deep neural networks within 
the generative process of visual works have led to exploring the 
concept of “style transfer.” It was recently shown that a purposely 
designed deep convolutional network could learn a stylistic 
content from a reference image as a multi-scale representation 
of textures. These textures, once applied to a new image, would 
impart it with the style learnt on the reference image. Producing 
novel paintings in the style of Van Gogh, Turner, Munch, or 
Kandinsky, then, just became a matter of feeding an image to the 
network and collecting the synthetized outcome (Gatys et  al., 
6 See http://grayarea.org/event/deepdream-the-art-of-neural-networks/.
2015).7 While largely automated, parameters within the system 
allow nonetheless some degree of experimentation (beyond the 
sole choice of input and reference images). Modulating the rela-
tive weight between style fidelity and image content allows, for 
example, a certain user’s control on the desired output. This tech-
nique has been implemented as part of the http://Instapainting.
com web service, where users can produce artworks in their style 
of preference and commission an artist to physically hand-paint 
the final product. The works of Vincent Dumoulin and col-
laborators have recently further extended the control over the 
deep-learning stylistic transfer by allowing multiple styles to be 
selected and combined at once, opening the way to new forms 
of visual creation, in which a graphical artist could “paint with 
styles” just as a musician combines sound textures to produce an 
original mix (Dumoulin et  al., 2016). Other approaches to the 
problem of “non-photorealistic rendering” relied on a recurrent 
neural network (RNN) architecture to separate a given style 
from an image content and transform new images accordingly 
(Zhao and Xu, 2016) or combined convolutional networks with 
random Markov fields priors to better match local feature patches 
in both images (Li and Wand, 2016). The latter technique has 
been recently adapted to produce strikingly convincing paintings 
based on rough doodles or sketches (Champandard, 2016).
Musical Composition
In the musical domain, experiments based on deep architectures 
have prolonged and expanded the corpus-based algorithmic 
compositions initiated in the 1980s, such as the produc-
tions of Emily Howell, David Cope’s latest embodiment of his 
“Experiments in Musical Intelligence” (Cope, 2005). In these 
earlier works, a model was trained on selected works (includ-
ing classical composers, from Palestrina to Rachmaninov, the 
creations of David Cope and, even, previous compositions by 
Emily Howell, the generative musical engine) that led to the 
production of musical compositions that integrated the various 
sources of the corpus they had been trained on. The creations 
of David Cope, although relying on a training phase, required, 
nonetheless, a major human input to prepare, select and filter the 
final products (Cope, 2010). More recently the FlowComposer 
system has produced startlingly realist songs. Starting from a 
corpus of about 13,000 lead sheets from a variety of styles and 
composers [ranging from jazz to pop and Brazilian music (Pachet 
et  al., 2013)], the system allows a style to be selected [such as 
“American songwriters” (which contains compositions from Cole 
Porter, Gershwin, Duke Ellington, and more)] based on which 
7 Some of the most effective generative models currently rely on an “adversarial” 
training (Goodfellow et al., 2014). These training architectures consist of a pair of 
models: a “generative model” (that attempts to generate some simulated data that 
mimic the statistical properties of the input data, e.g., some works by J. S. Bach, 
or paintings by V. Van Gogh, that resemble the pieces from the training set) and a 
second “discriminative model” that tries to separate true input data (i.e., the real 
pieces of Bach or Van Gogh) from the simulated ones. During the training phase, 
the generative model is optimized to fool the discriminative one and, conversely, 
the discriminative model will learn not be fooled by the artificial data outputted 
from the generative model. The outcome of this alternated, iterative, training 
produces a generative model far better at simulating data in the style of the training 
corpus than if it had been trained in isolation (Im et al., 2016).
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a new lead sheet, composed of a melody and corresponding 
harmonies, is generated. A musician is then required to give the 
finishing touches to the composition. “Daddy’s Car,” a pop song 
in the style of The Beatles, jointly produced by the FlowComposer 
and French composer Benoît Carré, was part of a set presented at 
the Gaîté Lyrique concert hall in Paris the 27th of October 2016. 
Still, this system too necessitated a significant human effort both 
in terms of pre- and post-processing. On the contrary, it is the 
capacity of deep architectures to learn structured representations 
based on raw, unprocessed, and sound data—without requiring 
an otherwise complex preprocessing phase of “feature engineer-
ing” by domain experts—that is, here again, proving effective in 
further automating the creative process.
Just as images are best treated using specific, convolutional, 
and network architectures, so musical compositions require 
bespoke machine learning architectures to model their complex 
multi-scale temporal dependencies. RNNs, by taking the output 
of each hidden layer and feeding it back to itself as an additional 
input, develop a simple version of a memory state that allows 
them to capture long-term dependencies in input sequences 
(such as speech or music). This capacity makes them particu-
larly well suited to represent musical samples. Deep versions of 
RNNs have thus been successfully applied to the generation of 
a vast range of musical samples, including polyphonic music 
generation (Boulanger-Lewandowski et  al., 2012; Lyu et  al., 
2015), Johann Sebastian Bach-inspired piano pieces (Liu and 
Ramakrishnan, 2014), or Irish folk songs (Colombo et al., 2016). 
In the same vein as David Cope’s and the FlowComposer’s mixed 
sources compositions, Daniel Johnson trained a deep RNN on 
piano pieces from more than two dozen classical composers 
spanning from Joseph Haydn to Claude Debussy and Maurice 
Ravel, producing surprisingly polished results without resorting, 
this time, to any further human input (Johnson, 2015). A dif-
ferent kind of RNN architecture, the long short-term memory 
(LSTM) network that had been previously used to generate blues 
music (Eck and Schmidhuber, 2002), has also been adapted to 
deep structures. Trained directly on raw data, their productions 
have proved often more musically plausible than those obtained 
using other RNN models (Sturm et al., 2016). Other architectures 
have recently shown promising results in generating satisfying 
musical compositions. Based on stacks of convolutional layers 
constrained to follow some essential causality rules (enforcing 
that the prediction produced by the model at an instant t is only 
dependent on past events), the Wavenet network was trained 
on MagnaTagATune dataset (Law and Von Ahn, 2009) and the 
YouTube piano datasets to produce esthetically pleasing music 
samples (Oord et  al., 2016). “Can we use machine learning to 
create compelling art and music?” is the question that tries to 
answer Magenta, another Google Brain research project.8 One of 
their latest deliveries tackles the problem of producing long-term 
structure in music. To do so a standard RNN structure has been 
improved to recognize patterns that occur across longer time 
intervals. Here again, the results are compelling; so much so that 
some deep neural network compositions are now considered 
8 See https://magenta.tensorflow.org.
good enough to be played live in front of a (human) audience. 
On the 27th of September 2016, Mark d’Inverno Quintet played 
a session at the Vortex Jazz Club in London where all of the 
music had been written by a computer, mostly based on deep-
learning architectures. Highlighting the potential of new kinds 
of interactions between algorithmic creations and human inter-
pretation, d’Inverno noted: “Even if you don’t think machines can 
be creative by themselves, they can potentially be creative friends. 
You can imagine a situation when you’re having a conversation 
with a machine offering prompts as a critical, creative accomplice” 
(Vincent, 2016).
The Spread of Deep Creation in the Arts
Beyond visual arts and music, applications to textual composi-
tions have also emerged, not only in poetry (Wang et al., 2016; 
Yan, 2016) and literary creations (Roemmele, 2016) but also in 
rap song lyrics (Potash et al., 2015) and even in the production 
of screenplays, where “Benjamin” a LSTM–RNN “automatic 
screenwriter” created by Ross Goodwin and Oscar Sharp9 wrote, 
autonomously, the sci-fi experimental short “Sunspring” (Newitz, 
2016). Generative choreography (Antunes and Fol Leymarie, 
2012; Crnkovic-Friis and Crnkovic-Friis, 2016) and creative 
productions of sculptures (Lehman et al., 2016) have also relied 
on the expressive potential of deep neural networks.
While a variety of network architectures are employed to 
tackle the specifics of each mode of expression (including various 
instances of convolutional networks for images, recurrent net-
works for audio and text, etc.), a common trait to these approaches 
is the capacity to detect and encode archetypal representations at 
different levels of abstraction, thereby capturing some of the natu-
ral—or man-made—structures present in the training data. As 
such, the deep-learning approach to artistic creation moves a step 
further in the direction of an increased autonomy from previous 
generations of computer assisted or computer-generated artistic 
tools. This property and the reliance on training data to generate 
an internal model of the artistic form offer new mechanisms by 
which the creative artistic vision can manifest itself.
The capacity to produce socially meaningful and artistically 
relevant objects would have limited societal impact if confined to 
academic circles. As the public use of automated decision engines 
starts to raise issues of legal responsibility (as in the case of the 
algorithms operating drones or self-driving cars) or fundamental 
rights (as with the use of personal data), the mainstream deploy-
ment of automated creative tools is bound to question the notion 
of authorship and the associated protection of the creations. 
Indeed, this transition from theory to practice, from toy models to 
public scrutiny, is already on the way. Prompted by the dual effect 
of the open sourcing of deep-learning development libraries and 
APIs (that facilitate the practical development of new applica-
tions by any computer enthusiast), as well as the availability of 
dedicated platforms and services (such as http://DeepDream.
com and http://Instapainting.com) where users can upload data 
and immediately retrieve augmented “deep creations,” the use of 
deep neural network to produce artworks is rapidly gaining in 
9 See Ross Goodwin’s website: http://benjamin.wtf.
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popularity. That these new waves of creations may, on their own 
merit, qualify as “art” is not so much in question (after all, they 
have been exhibited in galleries, played in concert halls). Still, 
as they become more popular, issues regarding the protection of 
deep creations are bound to emerge. What are the rules for an 
artwork to be copyrightable when the generative process is more 
and more automated and emanates from within the arcane tracer-
ies of deep architectures? What is the place of the human author, 
when his/her imprint on the creation is less and less traceable? 
Can deep creations be protected under copyright? And if so, who 
is the author?
The PrOTecTiOn OF DeeP creaTiOns
While there is no such thing as a universal copyright law, close 
to 180 countries are signatories of the Berne Convention,10 an 
international treaty that defines a common framework for the 
protection of the rights of the creators of artistic works around 
the world. The Berne Convention minimum standards award to 
national jurisdictions the right to prescribe the detailed imple-
mentation of the law (as stated in article 2 §2), which leaves room 
for significant variations in the resulting national copyright legis-
latures (such as in the definition of the subject-matter categories 
to be brought within copyright, or the exceptions from repro-
duction rights) (Ginsburg, 2000). A first component of these 
copyrights of “author’s rights” includes moral rights, consisting in 
the right of paternity (i.e., the right to be identified as the author 
of the work) and in the right of integrity (i.e., the right for the 
author to object to any derogatory treatment of his/her work that 
that would be prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation). 
A second component relates to exploitation or economic rights. 
They include the right to communicate to the public, the right to 
make reproductions, the right to make adaptations and arrange-
ments of the work, the rights of diffusion and exhibition, among 
others.11 Economic rights are granted to the creator (or to his/her 
employer for works created by employees in the scope of their 
employment), with a term of protection that varies according 
to national law (the Berne Convention fixes it at 50 years after 
the author’s death, but many countries have adopted a 70 years 
term instead). While these rights can be assigned to others by 
license or transferred by contract, moral rights are, contrarily, not 
transferrable and remain an attribute of the author only (some 
countries, such as Canada, allow for this right to be waived, 
though). As with exploitation rights, their duration differs from 
country to country: perpetual in France12 or Spain,13 for example, 
they end with the exploitation right in Germany (that is, 70 years 
after the author’s death) and are limited to the lifetime of the 
author in the U.S.14
10 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended on September 28, 1979, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 99–27 (1986), hereinafter Berne Convention.
11 Art. 6bis of the Berne Convention.
12 Art. L.121-1 to L.121-9, French Intellectual Property Code.
13 Art. 14, Spanish copyright law.
14 17 U.S. Code §106A “Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity” (in 
the context of visual art).
Before tackling in earnest the specifics of the protectability of 
“deep creations” and setting the stage for the necessary require-
ments applicable to these new objects [see The Author’s (Water)
Mark in the Deep Creation], the following section will start by 
stating some of the generally established, fundamental principles 
governing the attribution of copyright to artistic creations at large 
(see Deep Creations under Copyright Law).15
Deep creations under copyright law
Article 5 §2 of the Berne Convention explicitly states that the 
enjoyment and the exercise of copyright shall not be subject to 
any formality. An official registration procedure is therefore not 
necessary in order to enjoy a protection by copyright, the right 
emerging, in a sense, from the act of creation itself. Be that as 
it may, not all artworks are susceptible to be protected under 
copyright law. The first stage in the right’s assignment, therefore, 
lies in assessing whether or not a given work, e.g., a creation gen-
erated from a deep neural architecture, is deemed copyrightable. 
This condition relies in practice on the coexistence of a bundle of 
essential features: the presence of a “work” (see A Work, Fixed, 
or Expressed), the manifestation of “originality” in said work [see 
A (Rather Shallow) Threshold of Originality], and, finally, the 
existence of one or several individuals responsible for the work 
(see A Human Presence in the Algorithmic Pipeline).
A Work, Fixed, or Expressed
Article 2 §1 of the Berne Convention allows for the protection 
of “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, 
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression,” no other 
criteria such as merit or destination being taken into account. 
Article 2 §2 grants national legislations the freedom to prescribe 
whether or not an artworks shall be “fixed in some material form” 
in order to be protected. In the absence of a precise definition of 
the notion of “fixation,” the notion leads to a wide spectrum of 
interpretations. In the U.S., for example, works may gain protec-
tion only if they are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.”16 This applies to a work “when its 
embodiment in a copy or phono-record, by or under the authority 
of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration.”17 The same provision applies in 
the U.K.18 with the notable difference that, whereas in the U.S. the 
fixation of the creation must be by or under the supervision of the 
author, in the U.K. this condition is absent. In civil law countries, 
a less restrictive prescription of the materialization criterion 
is applied. The French copyright code states: “[t]he provisions 
of this Code shall protect the rights of authors in all works of the 
mind, whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose.”19 
15 For a general review of the copyrightability of artificial intelligence-generated 
works in the context of U.S. law, see Bridy (2012).
16 U.S. 1976 Copyright Act, §102.
17 U.S. 1976 Copyright Act, §101.
18 U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 §3(3).
19 Art. L.111-2, French Intellectual Property Code.
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Other countries do not set any fixation requirement at all (such 
as Spain or Germany), the sole requirement being that the work 
is expressed in a form perceptible by the senses. It is only then, 
in this process of projection from the internal representation of 
the author’s vision to a perceptible and tangible (although not 
necessarily permanent) expression that the act of creation occurs 
(Gendreau, 1994). In spite of this large gamut of interpretations, 
a common denominator to both the Anglo-American “copyright” 
and the Continental European “author’s right,” underlying the 
requirement for fixation/expression, is that copyright law does not 
protect “ideas” but, rather, the form in which ideas are expressed. 
An artwork should, and must, therefore leave the “closed box” 
in which it originated, be it the mental state of the artist or the 
internal configuration of a machine-learning model, in order to 
be considered for protection under the regime of copyright. The 
digitally filtered images created on http://DeepDream.com or 
http://Instapainting.com will all satisfy the criterion, as soon as 
they are displayed and recorded, as will the style-transfer images 
or videos captured from live scenes and processed in the moment, 
as demonstrated by Facebook in a recent prototype based on 
Caffe2Go, a new deep-learning platform porting convolutional 
neural techniques on mobile platforms (Gatys et al., 2016a).
A (Rather Shallow) Threshold of Originality
As article 2 §1 of the Berne Convention does not set any limitations 
to the protection of artistic works, national jurisdictions have inde-
pendently specified the minimum threshold that a copyrightable 
work must meet. A common standard states that a copyrightable 
work should originate from an author’s creative effort, and not be 
the mere copy of a preexisting work. This principle forms the basis 
of the second condition for a work to be protected by copyright: 
the requirement for originality. In the absence of any positive 
definition in the national laws, the interpretation of this notion has 
been left to the courts. In this sense, the European Union Council 
Directive 93/98/EC held in 1993 that a “photographic work within 
the meaning of the Berne Convention is to be considered original if 
it is the author’s own intellectual creation reflecting his personality, 
no other criteria such as merit or purpose being taken into account” 
(recital 17 of the preamble). In 2012, a decision of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union further clarified the condition of 
originality by stating that: “an intellectual creation is an author’s 
own if it reflects the author’s personality. That is the case if the 
author was able to express his creative abilities in the production 
of the work by making free and creative choices.”20 This decision 
therefore requires E.U. national courts to determine, in each 
specific case, whether the work is “an intellectual creation of the 
author reflecting his personality and expressing his free and creative 
choices.”21 This principle is, similarly, reflected in article 6 of the E.U. 
Copyright Term Directive (2006/116/EC). In U.S. law, the notion 
of originality is considered a constitutional sine qua non-principle 
for copyright protection. It was invoked in a 1991 decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in which it was stated that copyright 
protection could only be granted to “works of authorship” that pos-
sess “at least some minimal degree of creativity,” excluding thereby 
20 Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH C145/10, 2012, ECDR 6, at 89.
21 Id., at 94.
the attribution of a copyright on the sole justification of labor 
(the “sweat of the brow”). However, as the Court further stated, 
“the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount 
will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, 
as they possess some creative spark.”22 Although the definition of 
originality varies between national legislations, the imprint of an 
individual’s “personality” or “creative spark” is commonly required 
as a minimum threshold to allow protection under copyright.
Implicit in this delineation of the concept of originality, and 
particularly relevant when addressing the case of computer-gen-
erated works, is the necessary presence of a creator from which 
the “personality” or the “creative spark” emanates. Creations 
obtained through deep architectures will have to comply with 
this fundamental principle: should they result from a purely 
automated process, independent from any human input, and 
they would be excluded, on this basis, from copyright protection 
(in most jurisdictions, at least: we will see in the next section 
that the U.K. and some other countries carry provisions to the 
contrary). The fact that deep creations rely on a training phase, 
where man-made examples serve to train a model, would, in most 
cases, incorporate a human component in the generative process. 
However, if no specific contribution of any individual source 
used to train the model is recognizable in the final reaggregated 
piece, the link to an specific, identifiable “personality” would be 
missing, thereby hindering the unambiguous attribution of one 
or more “authors” to the final product.
A particular case worth defining in the context of machine-
learning creations concerns “derivative works,” i.e., creations 
based, in whole or in part, on another work. If, indeed, a signifi-
cant stylistic component from the training corpus is detected in 
the final creation, then it may be considered a “derivative” from 
the original source(s). Article 2 §3 of the Berne Convention 
disposes that “[t]ranslations, adaptations, arrangements of music 
and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected 
as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original 
work.” This disposition is followed in most national jurisdictions 
(U.S. 1976 Copyright Act § 101; German Copyright Act, art. 3; 
French Intellectual Property Code, art. L.112-3). The wording of 
the Convention makes it clear that the consent of the author of 
the source work is required in order to alter it without infring-
ing on the original work (a provision explicitly stated in the U.S.: 
“protection for a work employing preexisting material in which 
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which 
such material has been used unlawfully.”23), still, U.K. courts have 
ruled to the contrary, allowing that copyright may be granted to 
a derivative work even though it infringes on the source work.24 
While dependent on a training set, the artwork resulting from 
processing through a machine-learning architecture may still not 
satisfy the originality rule if no particular individual supplemen-
tary creative input can be identified therein. Consider the user 
of a “style transfer” application, as previously described, having 
selected two images in the public domain, Leonardo da Vinci’s 
Mona Lisa, say, and Johannes Vermeer’s Girl with a Pearl Earring. 
22 Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
23 U.S. 1976 Copyright Act §103(a).
24 Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co. Ltd., [Q.B. 1982] R.P.C. 109, 120.
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The combined painting processed through the deep model may 
be unique and reflect somewhat the style of the two artists, but the 
simple selection of these two classic artworks would certainly not 
suffice to imprint the user’s “personality” or “creative spark” in the 
final product. Similarly, a piano sonata produced from a model 
trained on a generic database of all Johannes Sebastian Bach’s 
works would generate works void of an additional, copyrightable, 
contribution.
A Human Presence in the Algorithmic Pipeline
The requirement for an original work establishes a particular link 
between a human creator and a materialized object. This ethereal, 
watermarked, presence of the author’s “personality” in the cre-
ated form is a cornerstone of the modern principle of artwork 
copyrightability and is, symmetrically, an essential component 
that defines the author. That a creator is required for an artwork 
to be copyrighted appears, therefore, as a legal imperative. In 
most Continental European copyright systems, the creator is 
considered the de facto author of the work. Furthermore, only 
a natural person may be considered an author: the French “droit 
d’auteur” refers to the copyrighted work as a “creation of the mind” 
(“une oeuvre de l’esprit,” as defined in art. L.111-1 of the French 
Intellectual Property Code). Similarly, section 7 of the German 
Copyright act states that “the rights holder is the creator of the 
work” (“Urheber ist der Schöpfer des Werkes”). The requirement 
of a human author is also made explicit in U.S. copyright law in 
the context of artwork generated through automated processes: 
the U.S. Copyright Office has indeed now taken the position that 
“in order to be entitled to copyright registration, a work must be 
the product of human authorship. Works produced by mechanical 
processes or random selection without any contribution by a human 
author are not registrable.”25 Finding the author, however, may not 
be so trivial when the intervention of an automaton in the creative 
pipeline, in the form of a non-linear algorithmic process, blurs 
the human contribution to the point where it is hardly discern-
able anymore.
What would happen then, when the work is genuinely pro-
duced independently by an algorithmic process, without any 
significant human input? Most of the national copyright laws 
would consider the work in the public domain in the sense that 
it refers to works belonging to categories of creations not pro-
tected by copyright law. However, this position is not universally 
accepted. In the case of strictly “computer generated” (meaning 
that the work is generated by computer in circumstances such 
that there is no human creator of the work), the U.K. copyright 
code provides indeed that “the author shall be taken to be the 
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of 
the work are undertaken.”26 A few other jurisdictions (such as 
India, South Africa, Hong Kong, or New Zealand) have opted 
for similar rules in relation to computer-generated works. Under 
this provision, the author is not the creator (considered here to 
be the machine), but the individual responsible for “arrangements 
25 Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition (December 22, 
2014), section 313.2 “Works that lack human authorship”.
26 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (United Kingdom), 1988, ch. 48, §§ 9(3), 178.
necessary for the creation of the work.” While this undoubtedly 
prevents a computer-generated creation to fall in the public 
domain, the law leaves nonetheless undefined, and therefore 
open to interpretation, the exact role of the person by whom the 
arrangements are made. Could it be the user of the deep neural 
network? The programmer who implemented that particular 
instance of a recurrent or convolutional neural network? The 
individual who selected the training set on which the internal 
weights were optimized? The investor who paid for the “app” and 
financed the development of the system?27
From finding the natural person source of the creative spark 
to determining those by whom the creation was made possible, 
whichever jurisdiction is favored, the matter of copyright attribu-
tion to original works produced through deep machine-learning 
architectures will therefore largely lie in identifying the author(s) 
in the algorithmic haystack.
The author’s (Water)Mark in the  
Deep creation
The potential scope of novel creative applications opened by 
machine-learning techniques prevents a general “copyright 
framework” for their creations from being devised. In order to 
explore some of the legal issues posed by these new creative tools, 
we will consider two applications of deep learning in the arts, 
where the technique has led to original applications: style transfer 
of graphical artworks (see Style Transfer, Derivative Work, and 
Fair Use) and the automated generation of musical compositions 
from a training corpus (see The Artist as a Database Curator).
Style Transfer, Derivative Work, and Fair Use
The possibility offered by recent deep-learning methodologies to 
separate an artwork’s style from its subject-matter, and to subse-
quently transpose this style onto another object, has led to the 
production of unexpected imagery. Artistic thought experiments 
(“What if Picasso or Van Gogh had painted the Mona Lisa?28 Or my 
portrait?”) can now be attempted with and their result visualized 
on a display with minimal human interaction. Some experiments 
have even recreated sequences of movies in the style of famous 
artists (e.g., Stanley Kubrick’s 2001, a Space Odyssey as if painted 
by Picasso29), or applied Van Gogh’s brush stroke and palette to a 
live video capture (Ruder et al., 2016). While this variation on the 
classical form of “pastiche”30 is not, strictly speaking, a new entry 
in the microcosm of algorithmic art [previous attempts at “learn-
ing style” from images (Drori et  al., 2003) had indeed already 
proved the potential of the technique], deep-learning approaches 
have brought forward a qualitative boost, as well as new levels 
27 In one of the rare instances referring to “computer-generated works” in the con-
text of section 9(3) of the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, the England and 
Wales High Court ruled that the image frames displayed by a computer game were 
held authored by the person who “devised the appearance of the various elements of 
the game and the rules and logic by which each frame is generated and […] wrote the 
relevant computer program.” (Nova Productions Ltd v. Mazooma Games Ltd, [2006] 
EWHC 24 (Ch.), 20 January 2006, at 105). 
28 See http://www.genekogan.com/works/style-transfer.html.
29 As can be watched at: https://vimeo.com/169187915.
30 Defined as “an artistic work in a style that imitates that of another work, artist, or 
period” (Merriam-Webster dictionary).
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of automation, to this established practice. The process of “style 
transfer” is now gaining popularity through the availability of 
web platforms, such as http://Instapainting.com, where users can 
experiment freely with the technique. Among these services, @
DeepForger (a Twitter bot created by @alexjc) boasts “[t]he Secret 
Manual to Creating Deep Forgeries.” The deep-learning-based 
bot automatically “paint[s] your photos using techniques from 
famous artists”.31 With the offering of such tools, the number of 
automatically generated composite artworks incorporating the 
contributions of multiple sources is bound to multiply. Since it 
is precisely the expression of an artwork (i.e., the form through 
which an artist expresses his/her voice, as opposed to an idea) that 
falls under the umbrella of copyright, “style transfer” directly hits 
at the core of the protection. What will then be the statute of these 
hybrid visual creations with respect to copyright laws?
Two mechanisms will participate in specifying the copyright 
assignment of the composite pieces: firstly, the transitivity of the 
copyright from an originally protected source to an image derived 
therefrom, and, secondly, the original selection of images used to 
produce the composition.
Let us first examine the legal relation with the reference images 
used for the composition. If the users own the copyrights to the 
two images used in the composition (or, similarly, if one is in the 
public domain), the user will keep a copyright on the derived 
work once the style-transfer operation has been carried out. 
Assuming the presence of the visual sources is recognizable in the 
combined product (which would depend on the parametrization 
of the transfer and should be examined case by case), care should 
then be taken to obtain the authorization of the original copyright 
owner’s to avoid infringement.
Could the work be considered to fall within the framework of 
“fair dealing” or “fair use”? In the European Union, the Directive 
2001/29/EC on the “harmonization of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society” includes the “pas-
tiche” in its exhaustive list of copyright exceptions [art. 5 §3(k)]. 
Its purpose is to enable artists to make minor use of other people’s 
copyright material without infringing on the reference material. 
However, to justify the exception the public should immediately 
understand that the object of the composition is not to appropriate 
the notoriety of the reference artwork’s author.32 In the U.S., the 
form of pastiche would fall under doctrine of “fair use” under 
section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. To evaluate whether fair 
use applies to a composite artwork, the courts would consider the 
amount of the original work used, whether the reference image has 
been sufficiently altered, the potential degree of confusion with the 
original artwork and the risk of commercial conflict with its rights 
holder. The fact that, in the “style transfer” mechanics, the whole 
reference image style is used to modify a second visual source 
would assuredly prevent a straightforward application of the 
“pastiche exception.” As deep-learning style-transfer algorithms 
becomes increasingly efficient at separating the stylistic charac-
teristics of an artwork from its content, the resulting composition 
may not satisfy the requirement that the derived work appears 
31 See https://nucl.ai/blog/forgeries-user-guide/.
32 Appeal court, Paris, 11 May 1993, RIDA July 1993, p. 340.
clearly unrelated to its reference. As a result, an uncertainty as to 
the origin of the art may ensue, as would a risk of interference with 
the interests of the reference art’s owner. It is only if the combined 
work offers a significant difference from the source, e.g., forms the 
basis of a critical commentary, if the original source is mentioned, 
that it could be considered a form of free expression protected 
under fair use, provided it is for  non-commercial use.
Independent from a potential infringement on the reference 
art, for copyright protection to be granted to a derivative work 
(in the sense of an “alteration” of a previous “reference” work), it 
must include an additional original contribution. In the context 
of “style transfer,” this contribution lies in the specific selection 
and subsequent merging of two images. Could such a mix suffice 
to reach the threshold of originality required by copyright law? 
As the combination itself is the result of the automated processing 
in the deep-learning engine, the remaining source of originality 
would rest solely on the selection of source pictures. Although the 
case would be judged on its particular merit, this appears rather 
doubtful, for it would be difficult, in most cases at least, to justify 
an “imprint of one’s personality” based on this limited choice. 
With the exception of the U.K. (and other jurisdictions where 
similar provisions apply), where the user may justify authorship of 
the final work as “the person by whom the arrangements necessary 
for the creation of the work are undertaken,” it is probable that most 
courts would deny copyright on the derived composition and only 
retain the copyright of the source images. However, recent devel-
opments in neural style transfer are now enabling users to select 
multiple styles, from a variety of sources, in order to compose a 
mixed composite image in a manner reminiscent of musical remix 
works (Dumoulin et al., 2016; Gatys et al., 2016b). As the number 
of “free parameters” offered by these new approaches increases, it 
is expected that the degree of creative choices they offer will soon 
reach the minimum requirement of an original expression that 
would justify, as such, copyright protection.
The Artist as a Database Curator
A characteristic of machine learning-based art is its dependence 
on a corpus of training data, from which a model is created. As 
with style transfer, the reference to existing, potentially copy-
righted sources, will raise the possibility of infringement. The 
selection of source data used to develop a deep-generative model 
may, also, provide an opportunity for creative input. In the case 
of deep neural architecture, the system would form a model of, 
say, a set of musical sources, by first identifying correlations in 
the sub-elements (audio frames, if a raw musical material is used 
for training or elements of a MIDI file, if the compositions are 
so encoded). Layer after layer, more complex (e.g., long term) 
correlations may emerge that are characteristic of the structures 
observed in the training corpus. Once the internal deep model is 
stabilized, the generation of novel musical pieces will merge these 
features in the attempt to produce a composition that conforms 
to the probability of associations learnt during training. In this 
process of disaggregation (of the musical source) in subunits, 
correlation (of said subunits) into features and reaggregation 
(of features) into a final composition, the chance of retaining 
significant sequences of the sources appears slim. But, in practice, 
whether material may persist through the non-linear processing 
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of the deep neural model will largely depend on the nature of the 
corpus, e.g., its heterogeneity (or lack thereof), and the param-
eters used for training (in particular the avoidance of “overfitting,” 
i.e., when the model generalizes poorly and tends to reproduce 
the exact samples on which it has been trained, a well-recognized 
problem in neural network architectures).
The risk of infringement will be directly dependent on the 
possibility to recognize in the final product the characteristics of 
the works used in the training of the model. When a deep RNN is 
trained on the full collection of Bach’s piano pieces, it is expected 
that any product of the generative model thus constructed will 
lead to compositions evocative of the master’s works and even 
reproduce, or imitate closely, small sections of the original works. 
If the musical training corpus is not in the public domain, the 
resulting musical pieces would then potentially infringe on the 
source material. The evaluation of an alleged infringement will 
depend on measuring a likeness between the machine-generated 
product and the source data: if the original work has been so 
transformed that insufficient similarities remain in the final 
work, no infringement would be found. Conversely, if the work 
produced through the deep model contains identifiable elements 
of an original work, it will violate the right of reproduction of 
the source’s author. In the U.S., the threshold of similarity has 
been set to a very low level indeed since the controversial decision 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.33 Arguing that “sam-
pling is never accidental […] [w]hen you sample a sound recording 
you know you are taking another’s work product”34 and holding 
that the reproduction of three notes from an original composi-
tion justified infringement, the court got rid, in essence, of the 
de minimis doctrine in the context of digital music sampling. In 
the same vein, a 2008 decision of the Federal Court of Justice 
of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof) stated that the “smallest audio 
fragments” are copyrightable and that the sampling a few bars 
of a drum beat can be the basis for copyright infringement.35 In 
France, a court decision of 2000 held that “the personality of the 
author may transpire independently from the number of notes” and 
thus, as long as the original composition is recognizable its unau-
thorized reproduction may justify infringement.36 Similarly, an 
older decision stated that the reproduction of four identical notes 
in a refrain constitutes an act of infringement.37 These extremely 
low thresholds in the application of the similarity metric used to 
estimate infringement in the field of music could severely limit 
the undiscerned use of copyrighted works in a machine-learning 
training corpus. The generation of musical creation may therefore 
require some additional cautionary procedures in the training of 
deep-generative models. In particular, it would be prudent to 
avoid overfitting the original sources in order to minimize the 
risk of “memorizing” and reproducing full sequences from the 
33 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
34 Id. at 399.
35 Metall Auf Metall (Kraftwerk et al. v. Moses Pelham et al.) Decision of the German 
Federal Supreme Court No. I ZR 112/06, November 20, 2008, at 56 Journal of the 
Copyright Society 1017 (2009).
36 Tribunal de grande instance, Paris, 5 juill. 2000. Com. comm. électr., March 2001, 
comm. n° 23, obs. C. Caron.
37 Appeal Court, Paris, 13 Nov. 1969 : RIDA avr. 1970, 145.
training set. The use of a “dropout” technique (Srivastava et al., 
2014) or increasing the number of layers of the network [as shallow 
architectures are more prone to overfitting than deep models (Ba 
and Caruana, 2014)] would help prevent such an outcome. Other 
approaches could rely on incorporating a posteriori procedural 
measures of similarity in order to detect and avoid plagiarism 
in computer-generated textual or musical works (Papadopoulos 
et al., 2014) or in images (Polatkan et al., 2009).
Could the generation of artworks, based on the selection of a 
specific training corpus, justify the attribution of a copyright? It 
is now well established that the use of a computer as a tool does 
not prevent the creation of an original work, the essential test 
being the measure of “originality” as previously discussed. The 
task will then consist in evaluating the presence of the author’s 
personality, or her creative spark, in the product obtained from 
a deep-generative process. Here, a useful analogy could be made 
with David Cope’s creations. Emily Howell, the machine-learning 
program created by David Cope to automate the generation of 
musical works relies indeed on the manual, thoughtful, definition 
of a unique training corpus (consisting, as mentioned earlier, in 
a mix of works by classical composers, but also including David 
Cope’s own compositions, as well as a selection of previous hand-
picked outputs from Emily Howell). When David Cope selected 
this improbable combination of musical sources, he undoubtedly 
manifested his creative intent. The generated work, although 
produced through the transformative pipeline of a computer 
program, corresponds, then, to a unique piece that only David 
Cope could have produced. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
the use of a deep architecture to produce compositions in the 
style of J.S. Bach based on training a model of all his piano works 
would not justify the claim to an “original” contribution (Liu and 
Ramakrishnan, 2014). Similarly, when Daniel Johnson uses the 
full collection of preformatted sources from the “Classical Piano 
MIDI Page”38 to train his RNN model,39 the result, however inter-
esting and musically believable it may be, would hardly qualify 
as a reflection of Johnson’s personality. The same principle would 
also apply o the automated visual creations of the DeepDream 
engine: if the sole input lies in the selection of the source image on 
which the deep model “hallucinates,” no additional “originality” 
would result from the processing of said image.40
Whereas most jurisdictions would grant David Cope the 
authorship on the product of Emily Howell, only in the UK (and in 
the other countries following the same practice) would the latter 
productions be granted a copyright. Indeed, should the creative 
process be considered “computer generated,” the individuals who 
took the necessary steps for the production of the artwork would 
be considered their “authors,” thereby granting them copyright 
to all productions generated by the automated process. Offering 
38 http://www.piano-midi.de.
39 See http://www.hexahedria.com/2015/08/03/composing-music-with-recurrent-
neural-networks/ the code for this project is available at https://github.com/
hexahedria/biaxial-rnn-music-composition.
40 However, the modification of the model parameters, i.e., the selection the layers 
and specific units activated to produce a particular effect (or, as with David Cope, 
the selection of specific sources used for training the model), may contribute in 
assigning a sufficient level of “originality” to the final work.
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systematic copyright protection to such automated production is 
not without risk, though. As machine-learning creative engines 
progress, the large-scale production of artistic goods on par with 
human productions is bound to reach an ever growing audience. 
A flood of machine-based creations may follow. Take Melomics 
109, the program developed by the University of Malaga in Spain, 
that used a combination of genetic algorithms and composition 
rules to produce a database of a billion unique songs (Quintana 
et  al., 2013): while these compositions are part of the public 
domain, others may not and could lead to innumerable litigations. 
Imagine an automaton that produces novel objects, each different 
from the next, be it a text, a three-dimensional shape, a sequence 
of sounds, and a graphical form. The creator of the machine has 
devised it so that it is capable of learning from known artworks. 
No specific selection of the works has been made and, for that 
matter, it could pick at random from the corpus of preexisting art. 
The intellectual contribution of the creator of the automaton con-
sisted, exclusively, in defining how the automaton can effectively 
learn a generative process capable of producing such texts, shapes, 
or sounds. Should the creator of the automaton hold a right on its 
output? As the proprietor of the end products, the right of selling 
or licensing them is assuredly not under question. But copyrights 
and author’s rights bring further prerogatives, both economic 
and moral, that extend well beyond mere ownership. Should 
these rights be systematically assigned to the aforementioned 
creator of the automaton? If a function of copyright is to promote 
creativity, the avalanche of automatically produced copyrighted 
creations, may refrain artists from expressing their voice and 
publishing their creations, for fear of infringing on the protected 
material (Jacobson, 2011). Care should be taken, therefore, to 
limit copyright attribution to the creations that are indeed the 
locus of a “creative spark,” a human one, that is, and not just the 
electric glint of a computational engine.
cOnclUsiOn
From graphical productions to musical compositions, deep neu-
ral network architectures are now the main algorithmic engine 
driving new forms of creative endeavors. Ever wished Rembrandt 
painted your portrait? Style transfer allows applying one author’s 
mannerism onto a second visual object. How about a radio station 
that would deliver a brand new Coltrane album every hour: deep 
learning allows generating musical pieces at the click of a button 
in the style of a composer, or a band. The increasing ease with 
which these algorithmic processes produce new artworks that 
rival human productions, as much as the automation of functions 
traditionally devoted to the artist, raise fundamental questions in 
terms of the value of the creation process and the protection of 
the artifacts generated from such processes. Copyright laws as a 
framework to promote creativity and protect authors are at the 
epicenter of this new debate. Who is the author when the machine 
learns from a corpus of preexisting works? How to identify the 
human contributions when the creation results from a complex 
process of decomposition and re-composition within the opaque 
construct of a deep neural network model? Answering these 
questions requires delving into the generative process at the core 
of the algorithmic engines and seeking the mechanism by which 
the personality of the author can be instilled in the final creation.
As the community embraces new tools that augment and 
stimulate the production of artworks, new sources of conflicts 
arise for which existing legal frameworks do not offer systematic, 
harmonized, mechanisms of resolution. Necessarily dependent 
on training data, deep creations contain indeed in their very 
fabric the ghostly, yet potentially perceptible, presence of the 
sources that helped forge the model from which they emerge. If 
left unchecked, it is the learning process at the center of these 
“creation machines” that may, therefore, lead to a systemic appro-
priation of protected material. In the face of the strict similarity 
metrics used to compare, for example, musical compositions, 
these new creations would pave the way to many infringement 
cases and greatly limit the application of deep architectures to the 
arts. A second concern may lie in granting, as some jurisdictions 
do, copyright protection to automatically generated artworks. 
The unbound production of copyrighted artifacts would end up 
artificially inflating the protected domains and contribute to sti-
fling the creative ambitions of many artists locked in a labyrinth of 
potential infringements. If copyright is to remain an incentive to 
creativity, an adaptation of some of its underlying principles may 
be required. Allowing for a fair use of existing artistic corpora 
while limiting the attribution of rights to those artworks that 
reflect an original contribution of human creators might help to 
maintain the function of copyright as a catalyst to creativity.
aUThOr cOnTriBUTiOns
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and 
approved it for publication.
acKnOWleDgMenTs
The author wishes to thank Andrew Thean for proofreading this 
text and Franck Macrez for his input on an earlier version of this 
work. The author is grateful to the reviewers for their constructive 
input which contributed to improve the quality of the paper.
reFerences
Antunes, R.F., and Fol Leymarie, F. (2012). Generative choreography: animating 
in real-time dancing avatars. In International Conference on Evolutionary and 
Biologically Inspired Music and Art, 1–10. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Ba, J., and Caruana, R. (2014). Do deep nets really need to be deep? Advances in 
Neural Information Processing Systems 27: 2654–2662. 
Bengio, Y., Lamblin, P., Popovici, D., and Larochelle, H. (2007). Greedy layer-wise 
training of deep networks. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 
19: 153–160. 
Bengio, Yoshua (2009). Learning deep architectures for AI. Foundations and 
Trends in Machine Learning 2: 1–127. doi:10.1561/2200000006 
Berov, L., and Kuhnberger, K.-U. (2016). Visual hallucination for computa-
tional creation. In Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on 
Computational Creativity (ICCC 2016), Edited by F. Pachet, A. Cardoso, 
V. Corruble, and F. Ghedini. (Paris, France: Sony CSL Paris, France), 
107–114.
Boden, M.A. (1999). Computational models of creativity. In Handbook of Creativity, 
Edited by R.J. Sternberg. Cambridge University Press. 351–373.
Boden, M.A. (2010). Creativity & Art. Oxford University Press.
12
Deltorn Deep Creations: IP and the Automata
Frontiers in Digital Humanities | www.frontiersin.org February 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 3
Boulanger-Lewandowski, N., Bengio, Y., and Vincent, P. (2012). Modeling tem-
poral dependencies in high-dimensional sequences: application to polyphonic 
music generation and transcription. In Proceedings of the 29th International 
Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-12), Edinburgh, Scotland, 1159–1166.
Bowles, E. (1970). Musicke’s Handmaiden: Or Technology in the Service of the Arts. 
Cornell University Press.
Bridy, A. (2012). Coding creativity: copyright and the artificially intelligent author. 
Stanford Technology Law Review 5:1–28. 
Buccafusco, C., Burns, Z.C., Fromer, J.C., and Christopher, J.S. (2014). Experimental 
tests of intellectual property laws’ creativity thresholds. Texas Law Review 93: 
1921–1980. 
Buchanan, B.G., and Duda, R.O. (1983). Principles of rule-based expert systems. 
Advances in Computers 22: 163–216. doi:10.1016/S0065-2458(08)60129-1 
Champandard, A.J. (2016). Semantic style transfer and turning two-bit doodles 
into fine artworks. arXiv:1603.01768, preprint.
Colombo, F., Muscinelli, S.P., Seeholzer, A., Brea, J., Gerstner, W. (2016). 
Algorithmic composition of melodies with deep recurrent neural networks. 
arXiv:1606.07251, preprint.
Colton, S., and Wiggins, G.A. (2012). Computational creativity: the final fron-
tier? In 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), Vol. 12, 
Montpellier, France, 21–26.
Cope, D. (2005). Computer Models of Musical Creativity. MIT Press.
Cope, D. (2010). Recombinant Music Composition Algorithm and Method of 
Using the Same. U.S. Patent No 7,696,426. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office.
Crnkovic-Friis, L., and Crnkovic-Friis, L. (2016). Generative choreography using 
deep learning. arXiv:1605.06921, preprint.
Dartnall, T. ed. (1994). Artificial Intelligence and Creativity: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach. Vol. 17. Springer Science & Business Media.
Drori, I., Cohen-Or, D., and Yeshurun, H. (2003). Example-based style synthesis. 
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR). IEEE Computer Society 
Conference on, Vol. 2, Toronto, Canada, 143–150.
Dumoulin, V., Shlens, J., Kudlur, M. (2016). A learned representation for artistic 
style. arXiv:1610.07629, preprint.
Eck, D., and Schmidhuber, J. (2002). Finding temporal structure in music: 
blues improvisation with LSTM recurrent networks. In Neural Networks 
for Signal Processing, 2002. Proceedings of the 2002 12th IEEE Workshop on, 
Martigny, 747–756.
Gatys, L., Ecker, A., Bethge, M. (2015). A neural algorithm of artistic style. 
arXiv:1508.06576, preprint.
Gatys, L.A., Ecker, A.S., and Bethge, M. (2016a). Image style transfer using convo-
lutional neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer 
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2414–2423.
Gatys, L.A., Ecker, A.S., Bethge, M., Hertzmann, A., Shechtman, E. (2016b). 
Controlling perceptual factors in neural style transfer. arXiv:1611.07865, 
preprint.
Gendreau, Y. (1994). The criterion of fixation in copyright law. Revue Internationale 
du Droit d’Auteur (RIDA) 159: 110–203. 
Ginsburg, J.C. (2000). International copyright: from a bundle of national copyright 
laws to a supranational code. Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 47: 
265–413. 
Goodfellow, I., Pouget-Abadie, J., Mirza, M., Xu, B., Warde-Farley, D., Ozair, S., 
et  al. (2014). Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in Neural Information 
Processing Systems (NIPS), Montréal, Canada, 2672–2680.
Grout, D.J., and Palisca, C.V. (1996). A History of Western Music. 5th ed. New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company.
Hiller, L., and Isaacson, L. (1959). Experimental Music: Composition with an 
Electronic Computer. McGraw-Hill.
Hinton, G.E., Osindero, S., and Teh, Y.W. (2006). A fast learning algorithm for 
deep belief nets. Neural Computation 18: 1527–54. doi:10.1162/neco.2006. 
18.7.1527 
Im, D.J., Kim, C.D., Jiang, H., Memisevic, R. (2016). Generating images with 
recurrent adversarial networks. arXiv:1602.05110, preprint.
Jacobson, W.P. (2011). Robot’s record: protecting the value of intellectual property 
in music when automation drives the marginal costs of music production to 
zero. Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 32: 31–46. 
Jordanous, A. (2012). A standardised procedure for evaluating creative systems: 
computational creativity evaluation based on what it is to be creative. Cognitive 
Computation 4: 246–79. doi:10.1007/s12559-012-9156-1 
Klütsch, C. (2007). Computer graphic – aesthetic experiments between two cul-
tures. Leonardo 40: 421–5. doi:10.1162/leon.2007.40.5.421 
Law, E., and Von Ahn, L. (2009). Input-agreement: a new mechanism for collecting 
data using human computation games. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 1197–1206.
LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., and Hinton, G. (2015). Deep learning. Nature 521: 436–44. 
doi:10.1038/nature14539 
LeCun, Y., Jackel, L.D., Bottou, L., Brunot, A., Cortes, C., Denker, J.S., et al. (1995). 
Comparison of learning algorithms for handwritten digit recognition. In 
International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks, Vol. 60, Perth, Australia, 
53–60.
Lehman, J., Risi, S., and Clune, J. (2016). Creative generation of 3D objects 
with deep learning and innovation engines. In Proceedings of the Seventh 
International Conference on Computational Creativity (ICCC 2016). Edited by 
F. Pachet, A. Cardoso, V. Corruble, and F. Ghedini. (Paris, France: Sony CSL 
Paris, France), 180–187.
Li, C., and Wand,  M. (2016). Combining Markov random fields and convolutional 
neural networks for image synthesis. arXiv:1601.04589, preprint.
Liu, I., and Ramakrishnan, B. (2014). Bach in 2014: music composition with 
recurrent neural network. arXiv:1412.3191, preprint.
Lyu, Q., Wu, Z., and Zhu, J. (2015). Polyphonic music modelling with LSTM-
RTRBM. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM International Conference on 
Multimedia, Brisbane, Australia, 991–994.
Machado, P., and Cardoso, A. (1997). Model proposal for a constructed artist. In 
Proceedings of World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, 
Vol. 97, Orlando, FL, 521–528.
Mahendran, A., and Vedaldi, A. (2014). Understanding deep image representations 
by inverting them. arXiv:1412.0035, preprint.
Mozer, M.C. (1994). Neural network music composition by prediction: explor-
ing the benefits of psychoacoustic constraints and multi-scale processing. 
Connection Science 6: 247–80. doi:10.1080/09540099408915726 
Newitz, A. (2016). Movie written by algorithm turns out to be hilarious and intense. 
Ars Technica Available at: http://arstechnica.com/the-multiverse/2016/06/
an-ai-wrote-this-movie-and-its-strangely-moving/
Nishijima, M., and Watanabe, K. (1993). Interactive music composer based on 
neural networks. Fujitsu Scientific & Technical Journal 29: 189–92. 
Noll, A.M. (1967). The digital computer as a creative medium. IEEE Spectrum 4: 
89–95. doi:10.1109/MSPEC.1967.5217127 
O’Hanrahan, E. (2016). Leonardo special section: pioneers and pathbreakers: the 
contribution of Desmond Paul Henry (1921–2004) to 20th century computer 
art. Leonardo doi:10.1162/LEON_a_01326 
O’Hear, A. (1995). Art and technology: an old tension. Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplements 38: 143–58. doi:10.1017/S1358246100007335 
Oord, A.V.D., Dieleman, S., Zen, H., Simonyan, K., Vinyals, O., Graves, A., 
et  al. (2016). WaveNet: a generative model for raw audio. arXiv:1609.03499, 
preprint.
Pachet, F., Suzda, J., and Martín, D.A. (2013). Comprehensive online database of 
machine-readable lead sheets for jazz standards. In 14th International Society 
for Music Information Retrieval Conference (ISMIR 2013), Curitiba, Brazil, 
275–280.
Papadopoulos, A., Roy, P., and Pachet, F. (2014). Avoiding plagiarism in Markov 
sequence generation. In 28th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2014), 
2731–2737. Quebec, Canada.
Polatkan, G., Jafarpour, S., Brasoveanu, A., Hughes, S., and Daubechies, I. (2009). 
Detection of forgery in paintings using supervised learning. In 2009 16th 
IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), Cairo, Egypt, 
2921–2924.
Potash, P., Romanov, A., and Rumshisky, A. (2015). GhostWriter: using an LSTM 
for automatic rap lyric generation. In Proceedings of the 2015 Conference on 
Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, Lisbon, Portugal, 1919–1924.
Quintana, C.S., Arcas, F.M., Molina, D.A., Rodríguez, J.D.F., and Vico, F.J. (2013). 
Melomics: a case-study of AI in Spain. AI Magazine, Vol. 34, n° 3, 99–103. 
Roemmele, M. (2016). Writing stories with help from recurrent neural networks. 
In 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 
4311–4312.
Ruder, M., Dosovitskiy, A., Brox, T. (2016). Artistic style transfer for videos. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1604.08610, preprint.
Scholkopf, B., and Smola, A.J. (2001). Learning with Kernels: Support Vector 
Machines, Regularization, Optimization, and Beyond. MIT Press.
13
Deltorn Deep Creations: IP and the Automata
Frontiers in Digital Humanities | www.frontiersin.org February 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 3
Srivastava, N., Hinton, G.E., Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., and Salakhutdinov, R. 
(2014). Dropout: a simple way to prevent neural networks from overfitting. 
Journal of Machine Learning Research , Vol. 15, n°1, 1929–58. 
Sturm, B., Santos, J.F., Ben-Tal, O., and Korshunova, I. (2016). Music transcription 
modelling and composition using deep learning. In 1st Conference on Computer 
Simulation of Musical Creativity, Huddersfield, UK, 1–16.
Todd, P.M. (1989). A connectionist approach to algorithmic composition. 
Computer Music Journal 13: 27–43. doi:10.2307/3679551 
Vincent, J. (2016). A night at the AI jazz Club. Verge. Available at: http://www.
theverge.com/2016/10/12/13247686/ai-music-composition-jazz-club-london- 
deep-learning
Wang, Q., Tianyi, L., Dong, W., Chao, X. (2016). Chinese song iambics generation 
with neural attention-based model. arXiv:1604.06274, preprint.
Xenakis, I., and Kanach, S. (1992). Formalized Music: Thought and Mathematics in 
Composition. New York: Pendragon Press.
Yan, R. (2016). I, poet: automatic poetry composition through recurrent neural 
networks with iterative polishing schema. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), New York, NY, 
USA, 2238–2243.
Zeiler, M.D., and Fergus, R. (2014). Visualizing and understanding convolutional 
networks. In European Conference on Computer Vision, Zurich, Switzerland, 
818–833. Springer.
Zeilinger, M. (2016). Digital art as ‘Monetised Graphics’: enforcing intellectual 
property on the blockchain. Philosophy & Technology 1–27. doi:10.1007/
s13347-016-0243-1
Zhao, Y., and Xu, D. (2016). Monet-style images generation using recurrent neural 
networks. In 10th International Conference, Edutainment 2016, Hangzhou, 
China, 205–211. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40259-8_18
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be 
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
The reviewer FS and handling Editor declared their shared affiliation, and the 
handling Editor states that the process nevertheless met the standards of a fair and 
objective review.
Copyright © 2017 Deltorn. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or 
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor 
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance 
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted 
which does not comply with these terms.
